No we can’t - Italy fails to change for the better
While in the long term the consolidation of the two party blocs seen in the April 2008 elections may bring greater stability to the Italian political system (and bring the nature of party competition closer to that found elsewhere in European democracies), in the short term the prospects for coherent and responsible government in Italy are poor. I do not agree that the outcome of the election is a good one for Italy. If anything, it is close to the worst possibe result. The right-wing parties have a clear mandate to govern Italy for the next 5 years and, as they showed between 2001 and 2006, they know how to maintain 'just enough unity' to ensure they maintain their grip in power (something the centre-left has yet to learn).
While the centre-left has made some progress in forming a forming a coherent political bloc, in the form of the 'Democratic party' - as reflected also in their decision to run separately from the radical left/green parties, the centre-right leadership - notably Berlusconi - remained intent on seeking power through the creation of the broadest possible electoral coalition, even if this involves xenophobic populists such as the Lega Nord, and unapologetic fascists such as Alessandra Mussolini and Giuseppe Ciarrapico. Berlusconi also wanted to bring in the new right-wing formation of another apologist for fascism, Francesco Storace. But this was blocked by the National Alliance leader Gianfranco Fini, who has made strides to distance his own party from its neo-fascist past. However, Berlusconi maintained that Ciarrapico’s inclusion was necessary given the support that his local newspapers could offer.
Speculation about the appointment of various individuals to government posts continues. The Lega is pushing for Roberto Calderoli to be deputy prime minister. This is a man who has supported initiatives by local activists to graze pigs on land destined for the construction of Mosques, so as to desecrate it in the eyes of Muslims. He was also forced to resign from the previous Berlusconi government after revealing on a TV show that he was wearing a T-shirt bearing the images that had previously provoked Islamic protests against the Danish newspapers that had published them. The Lega has exploited to the full concerns about an Islamic threat to Italian identity and security in the north, and against foreigners in general. These are linked to concerns about globalization and its impact on local communities, which have widespread resonance.
So why was the right able to make such a spectacular return for government?
The Prodi government had quickly become unpopular because of increases in taxes (deemed necessary to address the hole in public finances left by the Berlusconi government) and by its attempted liberalisation reforms which angered various professional lobbies. Moreover it was unable to deliver governing stability, with contradictory signals being given by it centre-left core (the PD) and its radical left on a number of issues, and with rebellions also coming from centrist parties. Indeed, it was the withdrawal of the centrist UDEUR from the coalition that precipitated its collapse. The centre-right was once again able to capitalise on popular fears related to security. Data showed that its positions on crime and immigration had resonated better with public opinion even in 2006. In the intervening years, it was able to better reflect concerns on issues such as the alleged influx of criminals from Romania, and the delinquency emanating from Roma camps. At the same time, fears about economic security were also exploited. Worries about restricted and reduced employment opportunities were associated with an apparent concern by the left to protect the employment rights and pension privileges of those already in jobs rather than a concern with increasing employment opportunities for the large number of young people without a fixed job.
Whether or not the creation of the PDL by Berlusconi (bringing together Forza Italia and the National Alliance) made a huge difference to the result is not totally clear. Accurate calculations for 2008 as regards the AN and FI are impossible given they ran a joint list of candidates. Nevertheless, the vote for the PDL in 2008 was 37.6%, compared to a combined AN-FI vote in 2006 of 36%. The increased PDL vote could also be partly explained by the influx of a number of smaller groups, ranging from Mussolini’s unrepentant neo-fascists to Gianfranco Rotondi’s new DC and defectors from the UDC such as Giovanardi. One should also take into account here that AN in particular would have lost votes to Storace’s La Destra. In any case, the PDL performance in 2008 is much less impressive when one considers that the combined AN-FI vote in 2001 was 41.4%. Clearly votes had been lost since then to the centre and to La Destra.
However the biggest gainer in 2008 was the Lega, which stormed back to levels not seen since the mid-1990s, polling 8.3% of the vote (rising from 4.6% in 2006 and more than double its vote of 3.9%). Despite the consolidation of the two party blocs witnessed in the election, the Lega’s role remained indispensable to the centre-right, and its increased vote was decisive in ensuring victory in 2008. Early data on electoral flows from the Piepole polling institute show that the large majority of the increased vote for the Lega’s in 2008 had come from those who voted FI and AN in 2006. In particular, the Lega had succeeded in winning back voters in its northern heartlands lost to FI in the mid 1990s, as well as new generations of voters. However, while the PDL lost votes in the north, it gained them in the south – winning back voters lost in 2006 to the UDC and the centre-left. The PDL did particular well in the urban peripheries and provincial towns and countryside of the south (less so in the urban centres), winning support among all types of workers, many attracted by Berlusconi’s promise to abolish local property tax for owners of one home. It also garnered support from voters dissatisfied with local centre-left administrations. For example, the PDL won 49.1% of the vote in Campania (the AN-FI combined scored 39.1% in 2006), where dissatisfaction was high with the centre-left’s handling of the refuse crisis, which had left piles of rubbish blighting the streets of Naples (Sud, le periferie votano Pdl, Corriere della Sera, 18 April 2008).
One other notable feature of the 2008 election was the collapse in the vote of the greens and radical left. Their join list collapsed from 8.1% to 3.8%. Most of their former voters appear to have switched to the PD (which in turn lost votes, mainly from its catholic element, to the UDC, though also to the PDL). Some green voters, however, also appear to have switched to the Lega (I flussi elettorali, la Repubblica, 17 April 2008). The Lega thus appeared to have benefited both from dissatisfaction with the left and a lack of willingness of some northern voters to continue to vote directly for Berlusconi, benefiting from its rooted presence on the ground and experience of local administration in the northern regions and appearing more in touch with local concerns to many voters.
So do Italians get the government they deserved? Well those that voted for the PDL and the Lega certainly did. If Berlusconi could, as promised, bring economic growth while reducing taxes and increasing spending on public works, then this would be wonderful. But the sums do not add up. Voters, perhaps correctly, may have judged the centre-right more likely to bring stability. But Italy’s problems require a clamp down on tax evasion, organised crime, political corruption and clientelistic practices in public procurement and employment recruitment. The centre-right’s record from 2001-2006 was not good in these areas. Berlusconi has previously condoned tax evasion, and conducted politics on the basis of patrimonialism, passing laws to protect his and his cronies interests in business and in avoiding judicial scrutiny. The record here is unlikely to change.
While the centre-left has made some progress in forming a forming a coherent political bloc, in the form of the 'Democratic party' - as reflected also in their decision to run separately from the radical left/green parties, the centre-right leadership - notably Berlusconi - remained intent on seeking power through the creation of the broadest possible electoral coalition, even if this involves xenophobic populists such as the Lega Nord, and unapologetic fascists such as Alessandra Mussolini and Giuseppe Ciarrapico. Berlusconi also wanted to bring in the new right-wing formation of another apologist for fascism, Francesco Storace. But this was blocked by the National Alliance leader Gianfranco Fini, who has made strides to distance his own party from its neo-fascist past. However, Berlusconi maintained that Ciarrapico’s inclusion was necessary given the support that his local newspapers could offer.
Speculation about the appointment of various individuals to government posts continues. The Lega is pushing for Roberto Calderoli to be deputy prime minister. This is a man who has supported initiatives by local activists to graze pigs on land destined for the construction of Mosques, so as to desecrate it in the eyes of Muslims. He was also forced to resign from the previous Berlusconi government after revealing on a TV show that he was wearing a T-shirt bearing the images that had previously provoked Islamic protests against the Danish newspapers that had published them. The Lega has exploited to the full concerns about an Islamic threat to Italian identity and security in the north, and against foreigners in general. These are linked to concerns about globalization and its impact on local communities, which have widespread resonance.
So why was the right able to make such a spectacular return for government?
The Prodi government had quickly become unpopular because of increases in taxes (deemed necessary to address the hole in public finances left by the Berlusconi government) and by its attempted liberalisation reforms which angered various professional lobbies. Moreover it was unable to deliver governing stability, with contradictory signals being given by it centre-left core (the PD) and its radical left on a number of issues, and with rebellions also coming from centrist parties. Indeed, it was the withdrawal of the centrist UDEUR from the coalition that precipitated its collapse. The centre-right was once again able to capitalise on popular fears related to security. Data showed that its positions on crime and immigration had resonated better with public opinion even in 2006. In the intervening years, it was able to better reflect concerns on issues such as the alleged influx of criminals from Romania, and the delinquency emanating from Roma camps. At the same time, fears about economic security were also exploited. Worries about restricted and reduced employment opportunities were associated with an apparent concern by the left to protect the employment rights and pension privileges of those already in jobs rather than a concern with increasing employment opportunities for the large number of young people without a fixed job.
Whether or not the creation of the PDL by Berlusconi (bringing together Forza Italia and the National Alliance) made a huge difference to the result is not totally clear. Accurate calculations for 2008 as regards the AN and FI are impossible given they ran a joint list of candidates. Nevertheless, the vote for the PDL in 2008 was 37.6%, compared to a combined AN-FI vote in 2006 of 36%. The increased PDL vote could also be partly explained by the influx of a number of smaller groups, ranging from Mussolini’s unrepentant neo-fascists to Gianfranco Rotondi’s new DC and defectors from the UDC such as Giovanardi. One should also take into account here that AN in particular would have lost votes to Storace’s La Destra. In any case, the PDL performance in 2008 is much less impressive when one considers that the combined AN-FI vote in 2001 was 41.4%. Clearly votes had been lost since then to the centre and to La Destra.
However the biggest gainer in 2008 was the Lega, which stormed back to levels not seen since the mid-1990s, polling 8.3% of the vote (rising from 4.6% in 2006 and more than double its vote of 3.9%). Despite the consolidation of the two party blocs witnessed in the election, the Lega’s role remained indispensable to the centre-right, and its increased vote was decisive in ensuring victory in 2008. Early data on electoral flows from the Piepole polling institute show that the large majority of the increased vote for the Lega’s in 2008 had come from those who voted FI and AN in 2006. In particular, the Lega had succeeded in winning back voters in its northern heartlands lost to FI in the mid 1990s, as well as new generations of voters. However, while the PDL lost votes in the north, it gained them in the south – winning back voters lost in 2006 to the UDC and the centre-left. The PDL did particular well in the urban peripheries and provincial towns and countryside of the south (less so in the urban centres), winning support among all types of workers, many attracted by Berlusconi’s promise to abolish local property tax for owners of one home. It also garnered support from voters dissatisfied with local centre-left administrations. For example, the PDL won 49.1% of the vote in Campania (the AN-FI combined scored 39.1% in 2006), where dissatisfaction was high with the centre-left’s handling of the refuse crisis, which had left piles of rubbish blighting the streets of Naples (Sud, le periferie votano Pdl, Corriere della Sera, 18 April 2008).
One other notable feature of the 2008 election was the collapse in the vote of the greens and radical left. Their join list collapsed from 8.1% to 3.8%. Most of their former voters appear to have switched to the PD (which in turn lost votes, mainly from its catholic element, to the UDC, though also to the PDL). Some green voters, however, also appear to have switched to the Lega (I flussi elettorali, la Repubblica, 17 April 2008). The Lega thus appeared to have benefited both from dissatisfaction with the left and a lack of willingness of some northern voters to continue to vote directly for Berlusconi, benefiting from its rooted presence on the ground and experience of local administration in the northern regions and appearing more in touch with local concerns to many voters.
So do Italians get the government they deserved? Well those that voted for the PDL and the Lega certainly did. If Berlusconi could, as promised, bring economic growth while reducing taxes and increasing spending on public works, then this would be wonderful. But the sums do not add up. Voters, perhaps correctly, may have judged the centre-right more likely to bring stability. But Italy’s problems require a clamp down on tax evasion, organised crime, political corruption and clientelistic practices in public procurement and employment recruitment. The centre-right’s record from 2001-2006 was not good in these areas. Berlusconi has previously condoned tax evasion, and conducted politics on the basis of patrimonialism, passing laws to protect his and his cronies interests in business and in avoiding judicial scrutiny. The record here is unlikely to change.
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